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RANDY BARNETT’S CRITIQUE OF 
DEMOCRACY (AND JOHN MARSHALL?) 
OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING 
THE LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE 
PEOPLE. By Randy E. Barnett.1 New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers. 2016. Pp. xiv + 283. $26.99 (cloth). 
Sanford Levinson2 
INTRODUCTION: AN UNFORTUNATE TITLE 
There is much that is interesting and worth discussing in 
Randy Barnett’s new book, Our Republican Constitution: 
Securing the Liberty and Sovereignty of We the People.3 However, 
the title of his book, especially for academic readers, greatly 
disserves the argument he is making and unnecessarily provokes 
peripheral objections, perhaps including this one. As a matter of 
fact, Barnett’s book is a worthy complement to Richard Epstein’s 
2014 magnum opus, The Classical Liberal Constitution: The 
Uncertain Quest for Limited Government.4 Whatever one thinks 
of Epstein’s substantive ideas—and I assume they are largely 
congruent with Barnett’s own—there is no doubt that Epstein 
gives the reader an absolutely accurate guide as to where he is 
coming from and where he is going. Where he is coming from, 
 
 1. Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory; Director, Georgetown Center 
for the Constitution. 
 2.  W. St. John Garwood and W. St. John Garwood Jr. Centennial Chair in Law, 
University of Texas Law School; Professor of Government, University of Texas at Austin. 
An earlier version of this essay was prepared for an excellent conference on The 
Republican Constitution, co-organized by Larry Solum and Kurt Lash and held at the 
University of Illinois on March 18, 2016. I am very grateful for the hospitality and 
intellectual stimulation received on that occasion, at least some of which is reflected in the 
differences between that version and these published comments. I also appreciate the 
incisive suggestions offered by Jill Hasday. 
 3.  RANDY E. BARNETT, OUR REPUBLICAN CONSTITUTION: SECURING THE 
LIBERTY AND SOVEREIGNTY OF WE THE PEOPLE (2016). 
 4. RICHARD EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN 
QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT (2014). 
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briefly, is what he accurately defined as the central liberal 
tradition associated with such philosophers as “Hobbes, Locke, 
Hume, Madison, and Montesquieu” (p. xi). One might also 
include, of course, such later philosophers as John Stuart Mill, 
whose principal book is titled, after all, On Liberty, and the late 
Robert Nozick, whose Anarchy, State, and Utopia offers what I 
assume Barnett finds a sympathetic account of the minimalist 
state that even libertarians should accept. Epstein was obviously 
writing for a sophisticated academic audience, which presumably 
would be aware of the difference between “classical liberalism” 
and the “liberalism” linked to the contemporary Democratic 
Party. Barnett, on the other hand, is publishing what is very much 
a trade book designed for a wider audience, and perhaps he 
believed that too many potential readers would be scared off or 
otherwise alienated by the very idea that they were being asked 
to agree with anything meriting the label “liberal.” To the extent 
this is true, it is an unfortunate commentary on the assumptions 
about the political illiteracy of contemporary Americans. In any 
event, it might help to explain why Barnett prefers the confusing 
term “Republican Constitution.” 
To be sure, Barnett (like Epstein before him) notes that 
members of the founding generation were more than a bit 
skeptical about democracy and frequently used the term 
“republican” as the alternative to that view. To put it mildly, that 
term is highly problematic with regard to providing any specific 
definition. “There is not,” former President John Adams wrote in 
1807, “a more unintelligible word in the English language than 
republicanism.”5 That being said, it is hard to escape the 
widespread use of the term both in American discourse and, just 
as importantly, the analyses of American historians especially 
over the past half-century.6 In his magisterial overview of the 
latter, Daniel Rodgers, focusing on the use of the term 
particularly by legal academics such as Frank Michelman, Cass 
Sunstein, and Morton Horwitz, summarized its importance as 
follows:  
“[R]epublicanism” was swept up as shorthand for everything 
liberalism was not: commitment to an active civic life (contra 
liberalism’s obsession with immunities and rights), to explicit 
 
 5. Quoted in Daniel T. Rodgers, Republicanism: The Career of a Concept, 79 J. AM. 
HIST. 11, 38 (1992). 
 6. See generally id. 
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value commitments and deliberative justice (as opposed to 
liberalism’s procedural neutrality), to public, common 
purposes (contras liberalism’s inability to imagine politics as 
anything other than interest group pluralism).7  
It is not surprising, then, that Epstein noted that the framers 
he (and Barnett) choose to focus on “did not embrace the now 
fashionable ‘republicanism’ that allows the government to 
demand personal sacrifice or even individual valor in the service 
of some higher, overriding vision of community good.”8 And, it is 
important to emphasize, “community good” in this context means 
more than extraction of taxes to pay for what economists refer to 
as “public goods,” i.e., goods like national defense, dams to 
protect against the flooding of rivers, and the like. They require 
public funding precisely because their benefits cannot be limited 
only to those who are willing to pay for them through a market. 
All of us can “free ride” on the general protection provided by 
missiles and submarines or the specific protection against floods 
or other natural disasters. Thus, only coercive taxation will 
provide the funds necessary to procure the general benefits, and 
it is completely legitimate to make persons pay for goods that they 
clearly and unequivocally benefit from. 
This is very different, obviously, from providing public 
funding for goods that can reasonably be sold through a market 
and limited only to those who can afford to pay for them (such as 
medical care, housing, food, or education, for starters). Defense 
of the latter, including the inevitable redistribution involved in 
taxing the haves to pay for benefits that will flow to the have-nots, 
requires moving beyond “classical liberalism.” After all, a classic 
trope in American thought condemns as a paradigm case of 
injustice “tak[ing] property from A, and giv[ing] it to B.”9 
Antagonism to such redistribution is at the heart of Epstein’s 
classic book Takings.10 “Property” in this context applies to far 
more than real estate; libertarians view much taxation as the 
equivalent of theft inasmuch as it is taken by the state from 
(have?) A’s to give to have-not (or, at least, politically well-
situated) B’s. 
 
 7. Id. at 33. 
 8. Id. at 25. 
 9. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 388 (1798) (opinion of Chase, J.). 
 10. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985). 
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It is not clear how much Barnett’s “Republican Constitution” 
is truly receptive to such redistribution. None of the cases he 
applauds involves B’s receipt of funds from A. This may, however, 
simply reflect the fact that the Randy Barnett who is the leading 
academic voice for a systematically libertarian perspective—as 
revealed in his earlier distinguished writings11—has written a 
considerably different book, in both tone and substance, for more 
general readers. So be it, though I suspect that other academic 
readers like myself will rue his decision. In any event, any reader 
who expects any discussion of the “republican” basis of the 
Constitution (as distinguished from a more “liberal” one) will be 
disappointed. 
Perhaps similar market considerations counseled against 
simply titling the book The Anti-Democratic Constitution, 
although that, too, would be accurate. He pays me the tribute of 
noting my own book Our Undemocratic Constitution,12 which 
argues that our Constitution, even as amended after 1787, does 
not survive serious analysis under twenty-first century 
understandings of democratic political theory. Moreover, both of 
us agree that those who framed the document in 1787 scarcely 
described themselves as sympathetic to “democracy.” Elbridge 
Gerry undoubtedly spoke for many of his fellow delegates in 
Philadelphia when he proclaimed that “[t]he evils we experience 
flow from the excess of democracy,” as did Virginia Governor 
Edmund Randolph when he similarly traced “the evils under 
which the U.S. laboured” to their origins “in the turbulence and 
follies of democracy” (p. 57). If that is the diagnosis of our 
political illness, then one surely would not expect “democracy” as 
such to be adopted as the treatment. And, of course, it was not. 
What I regard as a bug, though, Barnett accepts as an attractive 
feature. 
Barnett is thus similar to the many critics of my own book 
who reminded me, as they almost certainly unintentionally 
quoted the slogan of the John Birch Society, that the Framers 
adopted a “republic and not a democracy, and we should keep it 
that way.” In this context, a “republican” government is not 
 
 11. See RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2d ed. 2015); RANDY E. BARNETT, THE STRUCTURE OF 
LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (2d ed. 2014). 
 12. SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE 
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) (2008). 
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meant to contrast with “liberal,” as was the case with the 
historians whose work was assessed by Daniel Rodgers, but, 
instead, to contrast with “democratic.” Barnett does not seem to 
disagree with my descriptive analysis. Indeed, he adopts with 
characteristic exuberance a consistently anti-democratic posture, 
expressing general contempt for the idea of collective consent of 
the governed even as he privileges what he calls the sovereignty 
of each and every individual, about which more anon. 
Whatever title he wishes to give it, his argument is certainly 
an important one, which should be grappled with, though it is 
important to be clear about what embracing “democracy” entails. 
If, for example, “democracy” is identified with support of 
unfettered majority rule, there are in fact few devotees. Perhaps 
Jeremy Waldron fills that niche, but, for better or worse, he has 
few allies in his insistent attacks on judicial review and the 
protection of vested rights (and, even more, creation of new 
rights) ostensibly linked to such review. For better or worse, most 
contemporary “democrats” are “liberal democrats” of one kind 
or another who, as do Barnett and Ronald Dworkin, “take rights 
seriously” even as they also generally support governance by the 
majoritarian “consent of the governed.” To put it mildly, these 
dual commitments may sometimes be in tension with one another, 
but that simply underscores the complexity of intellectual life. As 
Waldron notes in his recent collection of essays, classical 
republican thought does not emphasize the necessity that rulers 
be directly accountable to the community in any systematic way, 
though, on the other hand, they should be motivated by a concern 
for the general communal welfare.13 Modern liberal 
constitutionalism, on the other hand, places much more reliance 
on elections as mechanisms for disciplining “representative” 
agents and providing the basis for legislation that reflects the 
preferences of majorities, even if there are constitutional limits on 
the extent to which those preferences should always be honored. 
Since the title cannot possibly be justified in terms of its 
fidelity to the explicitly “republican” tradition of Western, or even 
Anglo-American political thought, save for the sound-bite 
references to framers who indeed used the word “republican” to 
 
 13. See Jeremy Waldron, Accountability and Insolence, in POLITICAL POLITICAL 
THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 176–77 (2016). 
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distinguish themselves from “democrats,”14 one is tempted to 
think that it has to do with Barnett’s desire to discomfort 
adherents of the Democratic Party. He suggests that the 
Republican Party, at least from the time of Lincoln but 
substantially going back to the Federalists who hated Jeffersonian 
democracy, instantiates a basically libertarian (or, at least, anti-
democratic) view of constitutional propriety. Perhaps it is true as 
an empirical matter that more Republicans than Democrats over 
time have embraced such a vision, though it might take a 
considerable effort to demonstrate this when looking at a broad 
range of issues that might be subsumed under “devotion to 
liberty.” After all, it is contemporary Democrats who are 
generally committed to the norm of “reproductive choice,” a topic 
notably ignored by Barnett, who prefers to discuss admittedly 
outrageous regulation of would-be florists. Barnett made a fair 
point in the symposium at which an earlier version of this essay 
was originally presented: one’s views on abortion are inevitably 
linked to the extent that one views a fetus as a full human being 
entitled to the panoply of “natural rights” attached to that status. 
So perhaps one can understand his dodging that question in this 
book. However, there are obviously other questions linked to 
sexuality, sexual freedom, and sexual identity. One’s views on 
what has come to be identified as GLBT issues require no decision 
as to when one becomes entitled to full recognition as a human 
being. It is obvious, though, that contemporary Democrats are far 
more likely than their Republican counterparts to adopt what 
might be viewed as libertarian positions with regard to the legal 
(and social) treatment of GLBTs. 
But Barnett is not really offering an argument based on the 
actual history or current positions of the American political 
parties. His version of the Republican Party—and, therefore, a 
constitution ostensibly identified with that Party—requires that 
he ruthlessly ignore or dismiss not only a number of contemporary 
differences between the two parties with regard to the liberties 
they emphasize (or choose to ignore), but also the views of many 
officials elected over time under the Republican banner. It is one 
thing to deny the appellation “Republican” to the 2016 nominee 
of the Republican Party (whose election to the presidency Barnett 
opposes) Donald J. Trump, though that scarcely stills any 
 
 14. See especially THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), the locus classicus of 
this opposition. 
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questions one may have about the support Trump is receiving 
from, say, Speaker of the House Paul Ryan or Senate Majority 
Leader Mitch McConnell or, for that matter, Barnett’s original 
choice for the nomination, Rand Paul. But let that pass. It is surely 
more problematic to be similarly dismissive of, say, Theodore 
Roosevelt or, dare one suggest, Richard Nixon, both major 
architects, albeit separated by many decades, of the modern 
administrative and highly regulatory state. 
Consider, though, two of Barnett’s central historical villains, 
Woodrow Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt. That is surely no 
surprise, given recent demonization by right-wing 
constitutionalists of the Progressive Era. Epstein shares that 
animus. Wilson, of course, was a Democrat (with a truly 
regrettable deep vein of racism), and Roosevelt famously broke 
with the GOP in the 1912 election and thus guaranteed Wilson’s 
election over the Republican stalwart William Howard Taft. So 
we are invited basically to read TR out of the Republican Party, 
as I suspect Barnett might think it is true as well for the 1916 Party 
nominee, Charles Evans Hughes. But even Taft presents 
problems. Put to one side some of the “progressive” aspects of his 
Presidency. More to the point, perhaps, one would literally never 
know from reading The Republican Constitution that Taft himself, 
like the detested Oliver Wendell Holmes, dissented from the 
Court’s 1923 invalidation of a federal minimum wage law in 
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.15 “The right of the Legislature 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to limit the hours of 
employment on the score of the health of the employee, it seems 
to me,” wrote the former President and now Chief Justice, “has 
been firmly established.”16 
Some readers may be surprised to discover that Herbert 
Hoover was also a dangerous progressive. There is certainly a case 
to be made for that proposition; Amity Schlaes, in her admiring 
biography of Calvin Coolidge and his commitment to 
conservative verities,17 certainly has little good to say about that 
president’s Secretary of Commerce. There was a reason, after all, 
that FDR expressed regret in 1920 that Hoover would not run for 
the presidency as a Democrat. And Hoover as president 
 
 15. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp. of the D.C., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (Taft, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 16. Id. at 563. 
 17. AMITY SHLAES, COOLIDGE (2013). 
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appointed both Hughes to succeed Taft and then the New York 
Democrat (and Jew) Benjamin Cardozo to succeed Holmes. One 
can certainly argue that he has been unfairly typecast as a simple-
mindedly reactionary villain jousting against the heroic Franklin 
Roosevelt and his New Deal. But then one has to ask why the 
Republican Party even during the era of Calvin Coolidge would 
be so attracted to a genuine progressive. 
When discussing (and praising) Earl Warren for Brown v. 
Board of Education, Barnett tendentiously identifies him a 
Republican—presumably because he ran for the vice-presidency 
in 1948 as Thomas Dewey’s running mate, though he had in fact 
received the nominations of both parties when running for re-
election as governor of California. Unmentioned is the fact that 
as California’s Attorney General, Warren was a zealous supporter 
of the ethnic cleansing of Japanese-Americans and their 
Japanese-national parents (who by U.S. law were barred from 
becoming citizens) and relocation to what Justice Roberts 
described as “concentration camps.” Nor does Barnett exhibit 
equal pride in other decisions identified with the “Warren Court.” 
The Republican President who appointed Warren to the 
Court also appointed William J. Brennan, Potter Stewart, and 
John Marshall Harlan (as well as the ill-fated Charles Whittaker, 
who resigned after five years because of the unbearable tensions 
attached to the role of Supreme Court justice). But would even 
Stewart and Harlan meet Barnett’s criteria of “true 
Republicans”? I think not, because they often (but not always) 
presented themselves as devotees of “judicial restraint” against 
their colleagues’ innovative decisions. 
Indeed, as he notes, flesh-and-blood Republican Party 
leaders and their nominees to the judiciary usually embraced the 
slogan of “judicial restraint.” Of no one was this more true than 
Robert Bork, President Reagan’s ill-fated nominee for a position 
on the Supreme Court. Yet his teachings are now being subjected 
to full-scale revision by persons who, like Barnett, wish to endorse 
“judicial engagement” as a substitute for “judicial restraint,” even 
if “judicial engagement” is thought to be a far more palatable 
slogan than “judicial activism.” Bork was so twentieth century 
inasmuch as he endorsed Holmes’s dissent in Lochner denouncing 
the majority for invalidating New York’s law limiting the hours 
that bakers could work. Holmes famously acknowledged that 
some people might view the New York law as “tyrannical,” but it 
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did not matter: legislative majorities should be deferred to, and 
Bork enthusiastically agreed. He objected only to Holmes’s 
leaving some space available for reference to unenumerated 
“fundamental principles” as a source of judicial power. 
Barnett cannot be pleased with the fact that both William 
Rehnquist and, more recently, his successor Chief Justice John 
Roberts, went equally out of their way to praise Holmes’s dissent. 
The latter happily cited Holmes in his Obergefell dissent by way 
of denouncing the majority for deviating from the correct posture 
of “judicial restraint” in a society that, as Holmes insisted, consists 
of people with “fundamentally different views” about the 
(im)propriety of same-sex marriage. Such differences might 
include what might count as “natural rights” or even whether 
there are any such entities at all. (Holmes certainly had no such 
beliefs.) 
Again, one can certainly debate the merits of Barnett’s 
substantive notions, which are consistently interesting whether 
one accepts them or not. I would have no hesitation to 
recommend the book to students and other laypeople interested 
in a brisk and interesting argument about how one might 
understand the Constitution as tilting very much in a libertarian 
direction. But his title disserves his own argument inasmuch as it 
generates far more heat than light. 
Having gotten my unhappiness over his title off my chest, let 
me address what is far more important, the actual content of his 
arguments and their merits. I will first address his revisionist 
understanding of “popular sovereignty,” which is genuinely 
interesting and worth arguing about. Rejecting the common 
notion that the term refers to the collective “people,” Barnett 
instead adopts a radically individualist conception. It is, to be sure, 
based on fascinating views developed in perhaps the first great 
opinion of the United States Supreme Court, Chisholm v. 
Georgia,18 but its distinguished provenance does not overcome the 
difficulties presented by such an argument. 
I will then turn to his insistence that the fall from a prior 
constitutional Eden occurs only in the hated Progressive Era. 
Instead, I will argue that Barnett’s real enemy must be “the Great 
Chief Justice” John Marshall, whose principal contributions to 
American constitutionalism are given a quite distorted reading in 
 
 18. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
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order to fit into Barnett’s own argument. Marshall certainly need 
not be accepted as the last word on constitutional meaning. 
Perhaps McCulloch and Gibbons are ripe for overruling or, at 
least, significant modification. But one must ignore quite a bit of 
Marshall’s handiwork in order to enlist him into Barnett’s version 
of the “Republican constitution.” 
Finally, I will offer some observations about Barnett’s 
systematic dismissal of what is ordinarily meant as “democracy.” 
He does this in two quite different ways. The first is to express 
disdain for the actual abilities of Americans to engage in the kind 
of “reflection and choice”19 that underpins any truly serious 
democratic theory. The second is to promote a strong notion of 
“judicial engagement” that would in fact empower the judiciary 
to invalidate at least some significant number of statutes or 
administrative regulations that under Barnett’s views would be 
deemed “arbitrary” or otherwise in violation of the rights 
protected by a strong notion of individual sovereignty. 
ON SOVEREIGNTY, NATURAL RIGHTS, AND 
WELFARE RIGHTS 
There is probably no trickier notion in political theory than 
that of “sovereignty” in general and “popular sovereignty” in 
particular.20 Does, for example, “sovereignty” just mean the 
right/ability to rule (without limits) and never to be ruled in turn? 
That notion almost certainly derives from concepts surrounding 
Divine sovereignty. It is indeed difficult (though not impossible) 
to imagine a God who is a “constitutional sovereign,” limited in 
power not by other gods in a polytheistic universe, but, rather, by 
notions of morality that are God-independent.21 And, of course, if 
we credit the ontological notion of a divine sovereign and believe 
there are epistemological means of discerning the commands of 
that sovereign, then we are presented squarely with the claims of 
those who resist obedience to undoubtedly otherwise valid legal 
 
 19. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 1 (Alexander Hamilton), discussed in SANFORD 
LEVINSON, AN ARGUMENT OPEN TO ALL: READING THE FEDERALIST IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2015). 
 20. See Sanford Levinson, Popular Sovereignty and the United States Constitution: 
Tensions in the Ackermanian Program, 123 YALE L.J. 2644 (2014). 
 21. See obviously PLATO, EUTHYPHRO (399-395 BCE), for a classic statement of this 
issue. 
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commands in the name of their overriding duty to the true 
Sovereign of the Universe.22 
One can view the development of what political theorists call 
“modern” political theory in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries as instantiating the displacement of God as the 
sovereign in favor of a state that itself takes on the appurtenances 
of sovereignty, whatever exactly that term is thought to mean. For 
a while, of course, sovereignty was placed in a monarch who was 
thought to be magistrate chosen by God and thus entitled to the 
same level of obedience.23 The divine right of kings did not survive 
the seventeenth century, let alone the eighteenth century that saw 
both the American and French Revolutions and then the 
establishment of their respective constitutions. Instead, the notion 
of “popular sovereignty” emerged front and center. It is that 
notion that elicits Barnett’s interest. 
An old maxim, “the voice of the people is the voice of God,” 
denounced in a 798 letter from Aucoin to Charlemagne, took on 
a much more affirmative valence.24 Some might interpret this as 
simply an assertion that God in fact speaks through the voice of 
the majority; others, less sectarian, might suggest that we can have 
no real idea what God might desire (or even if there is a God) and 
that the authority once assigned to God should instead be given 
to the “voice of the people.” Quite obviously, in either case we 
may have significant difficulties in identifying “the people” who 
count as authoritative. Does this refer, for example, only to a 
unanimous declaration by the relevant “people” as to some 
proposition, with even one dissent making any claim of overriding 
authority invalid? Or, on the other hand, do we accept some 
notion of majority (or super-majority) rule even at the price of 
overriding the good-faith objections of those who dissent?25 We 
know beyond shadow of a doubt that those who framed the 
Constitution, “ordained” in the name of “We the People,” were 
indifferent to the inevitable reality of disagreement, so long as it 
didn’t become large enough to capture control of a given 
 
 22. See Sanford Levinson, Divided Loyalties: The Problem of “Dual Sovereignty” and 
Constitutional Faith, 29 TOURO L. REV. 241 (2013). 
 23. See, e.g., Romans 13:1 (King James) (“Let every soul be subject unto the higher 
powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God.”). 
 24. See, e.g., Vox Populi, Vox Dei, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vox_
Populi,_Vox_Dei (last visited May 10, 2016). 
 25. See, e.g., MELISSA SCHWARTZBERG, COUNTING THE MANY: THE ORIGINS AND 
LIMITS OF SUPERMAJORITY RULE (2013). 
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convention charged with ratifying the Constitution. After all, 
there was not a hint of a suggestion that the 30-27 vote in New 
York, for example, rendered illegitimate that state’s ratification 
of the Constitution. To be sure, neither Rhode Island nor North 
Carolina was in the Union when George Washington was 
inaugurated on April 30, 1789; that is evidence, though, only for 
the proposition that each state did have to assent, as a corporate 
entity, before being bound by the new Constitution. But anti-
Federalist minorities within the states were out of luck. 
None of this supports Barnett’s interesting and important 
argument, based largely on a debatable reading of the Declaration 
of Independence and a more plausible reading of the opinions of 
Chief Justice Jay and Justice James Wilson in Chisholm v. 
Georgia,26 which unequivocally rejected “state sovereignty” in 
behalf of individual sovereignty, where “the people” means what 
Barnett repeatedly refers to as “the people as individuals, each 
and every one” (p. 68). As to the Declaration, Barnett, like many 
Americans, focuses almost exclusively on the notion that each 
individual has an equal and inalienable right to “life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness” that, by definition, cannot be abridged 
by the state. Indeed, it might even comprise “tyranny” for the 
state to do so. This reading is used to support Barnett’s strong 
insistence on the ontological existence of “natural rights” (and, of 
course, our epistemological abilities to discern exactly what they 
are), though he does not seem to ground those rights on a Creator 
instead of, say, an Aristotelian capacity to engage in “right 
reason.” In any event, Barnett’s version of the Declaration leads 
to a radically individualist account that, among other things, 
requires a quite radical revision of what the Declaration at its 
beginning might mean by reference to “the one people.” It is, after 
all, this collective entity who seceded from the British Empire and 
who in doing so, it must be added, were decidedly non-
unanimous, given the plethora of Loyalists who opposed 
secession. There are more than a few overtones in Barnett’s 
approach of Margaret Thatcher’s famous statement that “there is 
no such thing as society. There are individual men and women, 
and there are families.”27 (I will presently turn to the implication 
 
 26. Chisholm, 2 U.S. 419 (1793). 
 27. See Margaret Thatcher, Epitaph for the eighties? “there is no such thing as 
society,” THE SUNDAY TIMES (Oct. 31, 1987), http://briandeer.com/social/thatcher-
society.htm. 
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of the fact that “there are families,” which raises problems for 
radical individualism.) 
Barnett confusingly suggests that his “modern” opponents 
“locate[] popular sovereignty in Congress or state governments, 
which supposedly represent the ‘will of the people’” (p. 72). It is 
certainly true that the central arguments in behalf of the 
legitimacy of institutions of representative government all involve 
some notion that they reflect the “will of the people.” This 
argument can be found in The Federalist itself and its embrace of 
what Publius calls “republican government.” But many 
“moderns” support various mechanisms of “direct democracy,” 
including initiative and referenda. That itself demonstrates that 
merely “representative government” is open to significant 
criticism as not being sufficiently reflective of popular “will,” 
whether because of inherent limitations attached to the idea of 
“representation” or, more ominously, to the specter of corruption 
and the capture of representative institutions by factional 
interests. This, after all, was the basis of the turn toward direct 
democracy in the western American states at the turn of the 20th 
century.28 One finds a growing mistrust of institutions of 
representative government on the part of both the contemporary 
right and left alike. To cite a contemporary phrase, these 
institutions are perceived as “rigged” in favor of the rich and 
powerful—or, if one wishes, of “progressive” cosmopolitan and 
liberal elites who are indifferent to the plight of Joe Sixpack—and 
something drastic should be done about this. 
But this may be only a relatively minor caveat, for key is 
surely Barnett’s emphasis on individual sovereignty. What the 
Declaration calls “the consent of the governed” apparently 
requires that “all these sovereign individuals” give their consent 
(p. 78, emphasis in original). This doesn’t mean that they must 
empirically agree, which is obviously impossible as a practical 
possibility. Instead, truly legitimate governmental commands 
must be those that would receive the consent of all rational 
individuals aware of their natural rights. This might be termed as 
a form of “ideal contractualism” run riot, though, of course, there 
are distinguished antecedents for such views. 
 
 28. See, e.g., STEPHEN GRIFFIN, BROKEN TRUST: DYSFUNCTIONAL GOVERNMENT 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM (2015). 
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The problem of tyrannizing even a single holdout is a real 
one; it can be said to be the basis of a work that Barnett does not 
rely on, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, inasmuch as one must 
imagine, in the “original position” behind a “veil of ignorance,” 
that one could occupy just any position in the society; therefore, 
basic constitutive rules should be designed to assure that even the 
person least well off will accept the constitutional order that 
places him in an inferior position as having been designed in a 
completely “fair” process. 
Barnett forces us to ask whether one can take truly seriously 
such a radical theory of individual sovereignty. Is it really the 
case—or in what sense could it possibly be the case—that “I am 
the master of my fate/ I am the captain of my soul”?29 Are we 
really never obliged to follow the orders of others who claim rights 
of “mastery” or “captaincy,” perhaps by capturing control of law-
making institutions that compel us to behave in ways that we 
would prefer not to or even plausibly believe violate our rights, 
natural or otherwise? I do not mean these as “knockdown” 
questions. Who among us has not been tempted, at one point or 
another, to assert our own individual sovereignty over the rest of 
the world, even as modified by the necessity to recognize the 
equal claims of others with regard to our common “natural 
rights”? But such arguments do seem ultimately to lead to a 
basically anarchic view of the world; taken seriously, they serve to 
invalidate the legitimacy of every single existing government that 
can be shown to violate some set of rights under one or another 
extant theory of “natural rights.” Any and all theories of political 
obligation become vulnerable, perhaps fatally.30 
I should emphasize that this does not in itself invalidate 
Barnett’s arguments. Perhaps every single existing government is 
illegitimate in some profound sense. To the extent that I take my 
own arguments seriously in Our Undemocratic Constitution, it is 
entailed that I do not view the present U.S. government organized 
under that Constitution as wholly legitimate. But neither Barnett 
nor I offer a full explanation of what follows from any such 
perception. Does it simply validate reformist politics designed to 
overcome the defects that surely exist, or can it justify armed 
 
 29. William Ernest Henley, Invictus, THE POETRY FOUNDATION, 
http://www.poetryfoundation.org/poem/182194 (last visited May 10, 2016). 
 30. See ABNER S. GREENE, AGAINST OBLIGATION: THE MULTIPLE SOURCES OF 
AUTHORITY IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2012). 
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overthrow of a presumptively illegitimate state? The question 
takes on added weight inasmuch as both Barnett and I share a 
deep interest in the existence of the Second Amendment within 
our Constitution and the extent to which it implicitly speaks to the 
potential of armed overthrow of an oppressive government by an 
aroused and self-regulated “people.” 
But, more than ever, any such views must rely on a well-
developed theory of how we tell the difference between legitimate 
and oppressive governance. What, for example, constitutes 
government in the “general welfare,” as against illegitimate rent 
seeking by well-placed factions who have captured government 
for their nefarious private purposes? One simply does not get 
enough of a solid sense of what the “general welfare” means to 
Barnett beyond the provision of certain “public goods” that, by 
definition, would not be created without coercive taxation 
because of the ability of “free riders” to share in the goods without 
having to purchase them via a market. But modern government 
obviously involves massive redistributions from one set of 
taxpayers to others. All of us, whatever our place on the political 
spectrum, can no doubt think of examples that we detest, even if 
our lists might not overlap. The real question, though, is the extent 
to which our lists of permitted “general welfare” expenditures or 
“public goods” would in fact overlap. 
As is common especially in books written for general 
audiences, Barnett is very effective in selecting cases that might 
make our collective blood simmer, even if not boil. I have no brief 
for ridiculous requirements imposed on would-be floral designers, 
and I happily ridicule the purported Oklahoma state interest 
asserted in Williamson v. Lee Optical Co.31 as a justification for 
compelling hapless glasses-wearers to pay rents to optometrists or 
opthamologists should they wish to have their glasses duplicated. 
I have no hesitation in teaching my students that no plausible 
explanation for the actual passage of the legislation can ignore the 
likely presence of campaign contributions directed at state 
representatives who are participating in a de facto auction market 
relative to their votes. No attractive world would come to an end 
if courts were more inclined to monitor such patent rent seeking 
in circumstances where the assertion of a public purpose is 
implausible (even if not outright “lunatic” as presumably required 
 
 31. Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
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by the most austere version of “minimum rationality”). But, at the 
end of the day, imposition of what is sometimes called “minimum 
rationality with bite” would not require invalidation of more than 
a small fraction of regulatory laws. Is it really the case that Barnett 
would be satisfied to stop with the invalidation of ridiculous laws 
limiting the liberty interests of would-be florists or opticians 
devoted to reducing the prices of duplicate glasses? 
Barnett might complain that I am overestimating the degree 
to which he is a radical individualist. After all, in discussing “our 
duties” even in a system of “natural rights,” he emphasizes the 
“duties to our children” (p. 126). To put it mildly, though, there is 
no discussion either precisely what these duties are or where 
exactly they come from. At the very least, they are obviously 
“positive” duties rather than any general duty simply to let the 
child “alone” so that he/she can develop without our interference. 
Presumably we are called upon to provide food, clothing, shelter, 
medical care (unless we are Christian Scientists), and education 
(for starters). 
A given family can be viewed as a mini-welfare state, with 
redistribution flowing from better off parents to decidedly 
vulnerable children. The obvious question, at least to 
contemporary liberals (if not libertarians) is what happens if, say, 
the parents die. Does the state have a duty to provide a variety of 
welfare goods to the child—and, if so, for how long? Must the 
state make sure that the child receives food, clothing, shelter, 
medical care, and an adequate level of education? Consider, in 
this context, such canonical cases as DeShaney or Rodriguez. The 
first, of course, left “Poor Joshua” to his extraordinarily sad fate 
unless the state could be sufficiently implicated in it, which, 
according to Chief Justice Rehnquist, was not the case. The 
second almost insouciantly announced that education, unlike 
reproductive choice, did not constitute the kind of “fundamental 
right” or “interest” that justified judicial intervention in the name 
of the Constitution. A footnote did leave open the possibility, 
however, that the case would have come out differently had Texas 
offered no education at all. One might believe that Justice Powell 
was sincere in writing this footnote given his later vote in Plyler v. 
Doe,32 which invalidated the state’s refusal to supply any 
education at all to undocumented children (also called, of course, 
 
 32. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
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“illegal aliens”). Quite obviously, different questions are raised as 
children make the transition into full-scale adulthood, but I am 
left curious how much Barnett’s notion of individual sovereignty 
and natural rights allows for a redistributionist state that takes 
from adult haves to transfer to have-not children. These children 
may, of course, be orphans, but, more likely, they have parents 
who simply cannot afford to purchase through the market the 
kinds of goods that are necessary to their flourishing in the society 
in which they are growing up. 
In the symposium on his book, Barnett suggested that I, like 
all too many latter-day political liberals affiliated with the 
Democratic Party, want to treat adults as if they were children. To 
some extent this is true, though not, I think, in the paternalistic 
way that Barnett is suggesting. That is, what is central with regard 
to providing many services to children is their essential 
vulnerability. A sick child may well realize the need for medical 
services, just as a hungry child knows that she needs food. One is 
not foisting these goods on a recalcitrant child who loves feeling 
sick, hungry, or exposed to the elements. Paternalism arises when 
the child would prefer to eat potato chips instead of broccoli, not 
in the provision of food itself. 
The most fundamental questions of the redistributive welfare 
state arise with regard to attributing responsibility for the 
sufferings of vulnerable adults. Are adults suffering from the 
consequences of a natural disaster or the vagaries of structural 
changes in the economy to be treated as “child-like” at least with 
regard to being free of fault for their dreadful situations, or is it 
fair instead to say that as captains of their fate they are responsible 
for the shoals they run into and the possibility of seeking into the 
depths? As Michele Dauber Landis demonstrated in The 
Sympathetic State, much of the defense of the New Deal welfare 
state was predicated on analogizing the unemployment of that 
period to other “natural disasters” that had elicited legislative 
responses under the rubric of “disaster relief,” all of which 
involved redistribution, of money, goods, or services to those 
without resources to purchase them contractually in private 
markets. All of us are subject to returning to the social reality of 
vulnerability most obvious in childhood.33 One need not demean 
 
 33. See Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in 
the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2008). 
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suffering adults when comparing them to children along this 
singular dimension of vulnerability and lack of fault for their 
predicament. Even if they are, in some sense at fault, as with the 
alcohol-abuser who develops liver disease, we are left with 
profound questions about whether even they should be left to die 
in the street. The modern welfare state denies us the luxury of 
dismissing the plight of the vulnerable as their own fault. 
Perhaps it is unfair, at least based on the four corners of this 
book, to attribute to Barnett a worked-out position with regard to 
the constitutional legitimacy of the contemporary welfare state. 
He is not willing to condemn taxation as theft, for example, and 
he scarcely presents us with a full-scale theory of the meaning of 
“general welfare,” preferring instead to concentrate on particular 
examples, such as the regulation of florists or opticians, that seem 
to be far away from vindicating “general welfare” interests. 
However, he does devote his first chapter to railing against the 
abominations of Obamacare, and he is probably the primary 
architect of the argument that the Affordable Care Act 
represented overreaching by Congress inasmuch as it was based 
on the Commerce Clause. However, he is strangely silent on 
whether Romneycare, the Massachusetts program passed under 
the leadership of then-Governor Mitt Romney, a central feature 
of which was a similarly coercive mandate to purchase insurance. 
There is much in the book expressing a regard for federalism, 
but, quite obviously, it is unclear why locally-based limitations on 
natural rights is more tolerable than that emanating from 
Congress. Certainly James Madison in The Federalist No.10 
offered no reason to feel particularly admiring of state-level 
governments, which were presented largely as cesspools of 
“factions” eager to capture governments for their own selfish 
purposes. Far more to the point, perhaps, is the fact that he has 
never publicly suggested that a federal tax-financed single-payer 
system would violate any constitutional norms even if, as a 
practical matter, it would be at least as coercive and redistributive 
as the Affordable Care Act and its reliance on private insurance 
companies to provide coverage instead of the national 
government. 
IS THE REAL ENEMY JOHN MARSHALL? 
Barnett, like many contemporary conservatives, exhibits 
remarkable disdain for Progressives and Progressivism. I am 
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surprised, frankly, that he did not choose, when distinguishing his 
book from mine, to note, with suitable criticism, the fact that I 
bookend the text first with a well-known text by Thomas Jefferson 
on the desirability of constitutional change and then, at the end, 
and perhaps more importantly, with a long excerpt from 
Woodrow Wilson explicitly adopting a Darwinian view of 
constitutional evolution. Both of these worthies were certainly 
disdainful of the views associated with the late Antonin Scalia, 
who proudly rejected any notion of a “living constitution” in favor 
of one that has long-since been dead, perhaps even mummified in 
1787 or 1791.34 As a committed originalist, Barnett has argued 
eloquently in favor of Scalia’s vision, criticizing him only for his 
“faint-heartedness” in enforcing it when presented, say, with the 
fact that federal drug control laws were decidedly oppressive 
when enforced against persons with painful and even terminal 
diseases.35 
Woodrow Wilson has relatively few defenders these days, 
and I will not take it upon myself to embark on such a defense 
here (though I certainly do not recant my quotation from him in 
Our Undemocratic Constitution). The reason is that the “living 
Constitution,” in reality if not necessarily in name, emerges well 
before the Progressive Era. It is a part of our basic constitutional 
DNA. Originalists, including Barnett, have a significant, perhaps 
fatal, problem handling precedent and the inevitable extent to 
which precedents, if respected, serve to amend the Constitution 
decidedly outside Article V. 
To be sure, Barnett protested, at the conference on his book, 
that The Republican Constitution is not intended to be an 
originalist tract. As Jack Balkin notes in his own contribution, 
inasmuch as Barnett emphasizes a single approach—or what my 
sometime colleague Philip Bobbitt calls a “modality”—to 
constitutional interpretation, it is that of “ethos,” i.e., drawing on 
the implicit premises of American political culture to discern basic 
constitutional limits. This is surely not surprising inasmuch as 
Barnett is identified with the revival of interest in what had been 
“the forgotten Ninth Amendment” and its seeming allusion to 
unenumerated rights. That still, however, does not account for his 
 
 34. See, e.g., Bruce Allen Murphy, Justice Antonin Scalia and the ‘Dead’ Constitution, 
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 14, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/15/opinion/justice-antonin-
scalia-and-the-dead-constitution.html?_r=0. 
 35. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, (2005). 
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argument that the downfall of American constitutionalism 
awaited the Progressive Era. 
Why should not a chief villain in Barnett’s universe be “the 
Great Chief Justice” himself, John Marshall? Although it may be 
safer, for a variety of reasons, to attack Progressives, including 
Wilson and Teddy Roosevelt, as radical deviants from well-
entrenched American constitutional tradition, that is, for better 
or worse, incorrect. Just as the snake was a key inhabitant of the 
Garden of Eden, so was “living constitutionalism” present near 
the creation itself. 
Consider what is undoubtedly the greatest of all of Marshall’s 
opinions, McCulloch v. Maryland,36 which famously upheld 
congressional chartering of a Bank of the United States in spite of 
the fact that no explicit authority to issue corporate charters is 
included within the list of enumerated powers set out in Article I, 
Section 8. Given that I have spent an entire twelve-hour reading 
course at the Harvard Law School engaging in a sentence-by-
sentence exegesis, I will certainly not take the time to write a truly 
extensive piece on every aspect of Marshall’s innovations in that 
decision. I will, though, look at some of the most important (and 
relevant) arguments—or raw assertions—found in Marshall’s 
state paper, which might be viewed as a remarkable example of 
the “judicial engagement” sought by Barnett. 
By 1819, most political elites had seemingly accommodated 
themselves to the constitutionality of the Bank of the United 
States. After all, James Madison, who had resolutely attacked the 
constitutionality of the Bank in a 1791 speech to his colleagues in 
the House of Representatives, signed the Bank renewal bill in 
1816. Moreover, he had in 1815 
…[W]aiv[ed] the question of the constitutional authority of the 
Legislature to establish an incorporated bank, as being 
precluded, in my judgment, by the repeated recognitions under 
varied circumstances of the validity of such an institution, in 
acts of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial branches of the 
Government, accompanied by indications, in different modes, 
of a concurrence of the general will of the nation.37 
 
 36. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 37. Quoted in BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 233 (1957). The general story of the renewal is told at 
227-233. 
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At the very least, he never formally recanted his earlier 
speech and said, for example, that he was wrong (and Hamilton 
was in fact correct). What makes most sense is that Madison 
conceded that we had a “living Constitution” avant le lettre that is 
amenable to change, whatever the “original meaning,” however 
defined might be, because of a mixture of practice and the sheer 
recognition of the value of the policy at issue. So if one views 
Madison, altogether dubiously, as a privileged “father of the 
Constitution,” it is clear that he was willing to watch his child 
develop in ways that he might not have predicted and earlier 
actively disapproved of. 
But then we turn to McCulloch itself. Upholding the 
constitutionality of the Bank in fact posed no difficulty. Three 
paths were available. One would have had the Court itself, after 
engaging in what we would today call “strict scrutiny,” hold that 
the Bank was really-and-truly “necessary” under a quite rigorous 
definition of the term. A second would have looked carefully at 
the process by which the Bank was approved by Congress and 
determined that they applied the correct standard of “necessity” 
and that the Court would defer to the obviously rigorous process 
even if perchance the justices were not themselves convinced of 
the Bank’s true “necessity.” Quite obviously, neither of these 
comes remotely close to describing the reality of Marshall’s 
decision. Instead, the Court both adopted a decidedly unrigorous 
definition of “necessary” (and “proper” as well) and gave almost 
absolute deference to Congress’s judgment that the Bank was 
“useful” or “convenient.” All of this eventuated, of course, in one 
of the most famous, and influential, paragraphs in the entire 
canon of American constitutional law: 
We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government 
are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But 
we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow 
to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the 
means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into 
execution, which will enable that body to perform the high 
duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the 
people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of 
the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but 
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consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are 
constitutional.38 
Barnett may draw some consolation from the first sentence 
about “limited” government. Marshall did write it, and there is at 
least one recent article by Professor David Schwartz that insists 
that the conventional reading of McCulloch exaggerates the 
deference that Marshall gave to Congress.39 But, surely, as 
Schwartz himself recognizes, this is not in fact the message that 
has been drawn from the case over its now almost-200-year 
history. It is not that one cannot read McCulloch more 
restrictively. As someone who has throughout his career 
emphasized the indeterminacy of what I have labeled “The 
Constitution of Conversation,”40 I would hesitate to assert that 
McCulloch is capable of one and only one possible reading. Thus, 
one should read Professor Schwartz’s long and valiant attempt to 
overturn the conventional wisdom. Yet, I remain quite confident 
that it is idiosyncratic in the extreme to read McCulloch as a case 
whose central meaning is in fact the limitations on the powers of 
the national government. 
But wait, there is more than simply the canonical paragraph 
quoted above. There is also the famous sentence, described by 
Justice Frankfurter as the single most important sentence in all 
the constitutional corpus: “we must never forget, that it is a 
constitution we are expounding.”41 I have explained elsewhere my 
perplexity at Frankfurter’s comment, since, after all, the sentence 
is a tautology at a formal level. But then, at long last, I combined 
the reminder at the conclusion of paragraph sixteen with the 
statements in paragraph twenty-seven: 
This provision is made in a constitution intended to endure for 
ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various 
crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which 
government should, in all future time, execute its powers, 
would have been to change, entirely, the character of the 
instrument, and give it the properties of a legal code. It would 
have been an unwise attempt to provide, by immutable rules, 
 
 38. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421. 
 39. See David S. Schwartz, Misreading McCulloch v. Maryland, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 1 (2015). 
 40. See SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED: AMERICA’S 51 CONSTITUTIONS AND THE 
CRISIS OF GOVERNANCE (2012). 
 41. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 407. 
6 - LEVINSON_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/17 9:01 AM 
2017] BARNETT’S CRITIQUE OF DEMOCRACY 135 
 
for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must have been seen 
dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur. 42 
That is, the Constitution is designed, in outline form, to 
provide the basis for a nation through vast reaches of time, 
including, for what it is worth, the expansion of the original 
Atlantic-coast nation to the shores of the Pacific and even beyond. 
It will, inevitably and properly, require adaptation when, as will 
inevitably be the case, “crises” (italics in original) and 
“exigencies” require that government act, even in what might be 
unprecedented ways. One can be confident, for what it is worth, 
that Marshall’s notion of “crisis” was as latitudinarian as his 
notion of “necessity.” If, for example, a future generation 
believed that the roughly one-seventh of the U.S. economy 
devoted to our medical services industry presented a genuine 
problem to American society, Congress could legitimately 
respond to this “exigency” by requiring that Americans be 
prohibited from their preferred posture of free-riding in favor of 
the required purchase of insurance policy from private insurers. 
Is this the “best” means to a worthwhile end? No. I would have 
preferred some single-payer system financed entirely through 
taxes, which Barnett appears to concede would be completely 
unproblematic as a “tax and spend” measure. But Obamacare is 
surely no worse than Romneycare, unless one distinguishes it only 
on the formal basis that the latter manifests the state’s “police 
power,” however coercive it may be, while the former is not 
allowed as an act of Congress. 
At least with regard to something like Romneycare (though 
not regulation of opticians or florists), Barnett seems to rely less 
on engaged judiciaries and more on what Ilya Somin calls “foot 
voting,” i.e., the ability of someone who does not like a given 
state’s regulation because of a (justified?) belief that it violates 
natural rights to pick up and leave (p. 175). He contrasts the 
ability to move from Massachusetts, say, to Texas with the 
presumably far greater burden of moving from Massachusetts to 
Canada; one should not be forced to leave the country for another 
one with a better mix of policies. But why? Business corporations 
relocate all the time, seeking the most favorable tax treatment for 
their profits. Why should we not expect similar flexibility from 
individuals? 
 
 42. Id. at 415. 
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The answer, if there is one, presumably involves the 
exorbitant personal costs of tearing up one’s roots and 
transferring one’s loyalties from our common country and 
emigrating abroad. But are there no such similar costs to moving 
from Massachusetts to Texas or, perhaps, even to New Hampshire 
or Maine? To put it mildly, being told that one can engage in 
“foot-voting,” even if it does serve as a certain kind of safety 
valve, seems almost pathetic as a true response to someone who 
has roots in a given state and would find moving out of it almost 
as costly as moving to a truly foreign country. 
Actually, to his credit, Barnett recognizes that “the policies 
of state government” can often be described, in Clint Bolick’s 
vivid term, as “grassroots tyranny.”43 We must take essentially on 
faith that this capacity for tyranny will be adequately limited by 
the fact that states can compete with one another and that 
relatively random individuals can engage in their right to “foot-
vote” by declaring they are mad as hell and will not take it 
anymore as they move to a more compatible state. 
The second great “consolidationist” decision of Marshall, of 
course, is Gibbons v. Ogden,44 which became the basis for much 
of the New Deal expansion of congressional power so disdained 
by Barnett. Perhaps imitating Marshall, himself a master of 
selective quotation, Barnett cites only the passages from Gibbons 
that support Barnett’s argument (p. 173). It is true that Marshall 
wrote that “no direct general power over [a variety of objects] is 
granted to Congress; and consequently, they remain subject to 
State legislation.” Just as with his assurances in McCulloch about 
the national government being one of “limited powers,” one can 
doubt the degree to which Marshall truly agreed with critics of 
what persons like Patrick Henry and Brutus termed as 
“consolidated” government.45 What is missing in Barnett’s 
account is the (in)famous paragraph that has been widely 
 
 43. Id. at 180. 
 44. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). 
 45. It is interesting that Greg Abbott, the governor of Texas who supports a new 
constitutional convention to propose a number of amendments gathered together under 
the rubric of “The Texas Plan,” and who draws quite explicitly on Barnett’s advocacy of 
“the Repeal Amendment” that would allow de facto nullification of federal laws, avidly 
quotes Brutus and other anti-Federalist critics of the Constitution. The problem, of course, 
is that, as with many dissenters, their altogether cogent critiques simply reinforce the view 
that the Constitution, correctly interpreted, did indeed work to centralize power far more 
than they (and Barnett) would prefer. 
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interpreted as Marshall giving away the store with regard to the 
congressional power and, just as importantly, the irrelevance of 
“engaged courts” to serve as monitors over any overreaching that 
might occur: 
The subject, . . . is . . . commerce, “among the several states.” 
The word “among” means intermingled with. A thing which is 
among others, is intermingled with them. Commerce among 
the states, cannot stop at the external boundary line of each 
state, but may be introduced into the interior. It is not intended 
to say, that these words comprehend that commerce, which is 
completely internal, which is carried on between man and man 
in a state, or between different parts of the same state, and 
which does not extend to or affect other states. Such a power 
would be inconvenient, and is certainly unnecessary. 
Comprehensive as the word “among” is, it may very properly be 
restricted to that commerce which concerns more states than 
one. . . . The genius and character of the whole government 
seem to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external 
concerns of the nation, and to those internal concerns which 
affect the states generally; but not to those which are 
completely within a particular state, which do not affect other 
states, and with which it is not necessary to interfere, for the 
purpose of executing some of the general powers of the 
government. The completely internal commerce of a state, 
then may be considered as reserved for the state itself 
(emphasis added).46 
. . . . This power, like all others vested in congress, is complete 
in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and 
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the 
constitution If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty 
of congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to 
those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, 
and among the several states, is vested in congress as absolutely 
as it would be in a single government, having in its constitution 
the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found 
in the constitution of the United States. The wisdom and the 
discretion of congress, their identity with the people, and the 
influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in 
this, as in many other instances, as that, for example, of declaring 
war, the sole restraints on which they have relied, to secure them 
from its abuse. They are the restraints on which the people must 
 
 46. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194–95. 
6 - LEVINSON_DRAFT 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 1/3/17 9:01 AM 
138 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 32:113 
 
often rely solely, in all representative governments…. (emphasis 
added).47 
I certainly do not present Marshall as the last word on 
constitutional interpretation. One is surely free to denounce him 
as an unfaithful agent and, indeed, betrayer of his oath of fidelity 
to the Constitution. But, obviously, it is harder, in terms of making 
a credible argument within America’s constitutional culture, to 
denounce “the Great Chief Justice” in the same terms directed by 
the late Antonin Scalia at his adversaries. Better to construct a 
fictitious history of unbroken constitutional fidelity—save for the 
rampages first of Justice Story in Prigg48 and then Chief Justice 
Taney in Dred Scot49—than to recognize the responsibility of 
Marshall himself for the constitutional vision, whatever we wish 
to call it, that Marshall instantiated. 
BARNETT’S DISDAIN FOR DEMOCRACY ITSELF 
It is not surprising, nor necessarily a cause for criticism, that 
Barnett is explicitly anti-democratic. After all, “taking rights 
seriously,” which is Barnett’s theme every bit as much as it was 
Ronald Dworkin’s, whatever some obvious differences in their 
respective positions, entails feeling entitled to disregard 
presumptively majoritarian preferences in favor of honoring the 
rights that are possessed by individual members (or, on occasion, 
groups) of the constitutional order. The more one insists on 
“limited government,” the more, by definition, one is disinclined 
to honor the choices made by government, even if based on 
popular (but not unanimous) consent. That would be true, of 
course, even if one were inclined to view public officials as 
honorable Publian persons who always kept front and center their 
commitment to the public good and not, for example, panderers 
to the demands of rent-seeking politically powerful interest 
groups. As Dworkin insisted, even public-serving policy goals 
took second place to individual rights or, as Barnett would 
emphasize, the limitations on government. Presumably he would 
applaud what was literally the final act of James Madison as 
President, the veto of a public improvements act that obviously 
 
 47. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 196–97. 
 48. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
 49. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856), superseded (1868). 
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gained the approval of both houses of Congress.50 “I am not 
unaware,” Madison wrote, “of the great importance of roads and 
canals and the improved navigation of water courses, and that a 
power in the National Legislature to provide for them might be 
exercised with signal advantage to the general prosperity.”51 So 
what’s the problem? “[S]uch a power is not expressly given by the 
Constitution, and believing that it cannot be deduced from any 
part of it without an inadmissible latitude of construction,” he felt 
under a duty to veto the legislation.52 Obviously, Marshall had not 
yet published his opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, but one 
doubts that Madison would necessarily have changed his mind. 
After all, he wrote a denunciatory letter to Virginia Chief Justice 
Spencer Roane suggesting that Marshall’s opinion, had it been 
available in 1788, would have led to the rejection of the 
Constitution by delegates to the ratifying convention.53 Taking 
rights and limitations seriously just means that commitments to 
“establishing justice” or achieving the “general welfare” will be 
subordinated to the “blessings of liberty,” whatever the wishes of 
a benighted public might be. 
But Barnett appears to believe that it is foolish to assume that 
legislators will necessarily be wise with regard to their judgments 
about justice or welfare, in part because in no serious sense will 
their feet be held to the fire by electorates themselves competent 
to make such general judgments. Barnett cites Ilya Somin54 as 
“explain[ing]” that “[b]ecause one’s vote in an election is 
swamped by the ballots of millions of others, it is simply irrational 
for most persons to invest too heavily in the time and resources to 
learn what it takes to vote wisely”55 The typical voter, therefore, 
is decidedly ignorant, even if we concede that with regard to 
matters where their choices do matter, they might be quite 
intelligent (and well-informed). Moreover, with rare exceptions—
and none at the national level—we can vote only for ostensible 
 
 50. See 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 584–585 (James Richardson 
ed., 1897), http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/metabook?id=mppresidents. 
 51. James Madison, Veto of federal public works bill (March 3, 1817), 
http://constitution.org/jm/18170303_veto.txt. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Letter No. CCCXXXI from James Madison to Judge Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 
THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 435 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
 54. See ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER 
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER (2013). 
 55. BARNETT, supra note 11, at 176. 
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“representatives” and not on specific policies themselves. We 
necessarily must choose, when voting for a particular 
“representative,” a “complex package of economic and social 
policies that voters are not allowed to disaggregate. You must 
vote for one of the packages, or not vote at all.”56 What this leads 
to is the quite thundering declaration that “a system of voting does 
not allow the sovereign people to ‘rule,’ and it is a pernicious myth 
to claim that they do.”57 It is, therefore, a happy accident if 
Congress (or perhaps any other legislative assembly) actually gets 
it right with regard to serving the general welfare. Such views 
hardly lead one to view the national government—or perhaps any 
significantly large government—as truly legitimate or even likely 
to make normatively desirable decisions. 
Perhaps this helps to explain Barnett’s seeming opposition to 
the Seventeenth Amendment, adopted in 1913 to transfer 
selection of senators from state legislatures to the general 
electorate.58 Interestingly enough, like Texas Governor Greg 
Abbott in his recent proclamation of a Texas Plan of proposed 
amendments to the Constitution, Barnett does not call for the 
repeal of the Amendment, perhaps because it is almost 
unthinkable that an empowered electorate would in fact 
acquiesce to its neutering. Instead, he endorses a de-facto 
nullification procedure that would lodge the power in “a majority 
of state legislatures representing a majority of the population to 
repeal any federal law or regulation.”59 I presume that he rejects 
Steve Griffin’s call for a procedure for national referenda because 
that would lodge entirely too much power in the decidedly 
unreliable collective “people” themselves. 
As a matter of fact, there is genuine force to Somin’s and 
Barnett’s critiques, even if one finds them, Somin’s especially, to 
be a bit exaggerated. Both Barnett and I, in contributions to a 
symposium at Yale on Bruce Ackerman’s work, independently 
cited a powerful statement by the late Yale Professor of History 
Edmund Morgan, from his book We the People. “Government,” 
wrote Morgan, “requires make believe.” The “fiction” of popular 
sovereignty is precisely the assertion that “the few” can 
legitimately “govern the many” because of their ostensible 
 
 56. Id. at 177. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See id. at 247–48. 
 59. Id. at 255 (emphasis added). 
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accountability to the many through mechanisms of election and 
the like.60 To the extent that one adopts the description of this as 
a “fiction,” perhaps akin to a Platonic “royal lie,” useful only to 
loll the masses into unmerited acceptance of a status quo, then the 
foundations of a system ostensibly predicated on rule by “We the 
People” seem quite fragile. 
In any event, one reason that Barnett rejects a “democratic 
Constitution”—or critiques based on the premise that the present 
Constitution is insufficiently democratic—is that he has no real 
regard for the very idea of democracy, defined as the only 
somewhat constrained ability of “the people” to control their own 
collective futures, whatever his genuine regard for individuals 
who feel beset upon by the demands of the modern regulatory 
state. I wish that one could simply dismiss his concerns about 
democracy as baseless. Who, however, not only looking at the 
general history of the 20th century, but also at the current 
spectacle in the autumn of 2016 of what passes for political 
campaigning in the United States, can deny the force of the 
critique of democracy in the name of other values?61 
CONCLUSION 
One must recognize, however ruefully, that Barnett sets out 
a powerful bill of particulars, even if one is disinclined, either on 
ontological or epistemological grounds, to join his embrace of 
“natural rights.” Nor does it help that his particular brand of 
“classical liberalism” seems to leave little room for a flourishing 
notion of communal self-governance and a commitment to the 
importance of such elements of social justice and general welfare 
as require the aid of a coercive government that requires the 
transfer of resources from haves to have-nots. 
Barnett’s book will undoubtedly spark many arguments of 
the type set out in this symposium. But perhaps the real test of its 
 
 60. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 13–14 (1988). 
 61.  This review was obviously written before the astounding (and catastrophic) 
election of Donald Trump as president.  It is hard to deny that the campaign in general, 
and then the result, might legitimately test one’s faith in the democratic 
experiment.  Should in fact one reject the foundational belief in the capacity of Americans 
to manifest an acceptable degree of “reflection and choice” about how to manage our 
necessarily intertwined lives, we must basically return to Ground Zero with regard to 
imagining a constitution adequate to such a reality. 
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thesis will be less its impact on the academic community, who may 
not be the truly target audience, and more the degree to which it 
is embraced by self-identified members of the modern Republican 
Party. If, on the other hand, it is most enthusiastically received by 
adherents of the Libertarian Party, then it will be harder than ever 
to identify Barnett’s Constitution, whether or not one finds it 
attractive, with “the Republican Constitution.” 
